The announced commencement of a Peace Process, supposedly aimed at finally resolving great and bloody issues, rarely got so little attention from those directly concerned.
No trace of the enthusiasm, bordering on euphoria, which followed President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 or the Rabin-Arafat handshake of 1993. Nor could one feel anything like the tension and anxiety of August 2000 — when Israelis and Palestinians alike felt (and with good reason) that success or failure of the Camp David talks could quite literally spell the life or death of themselves and their loved ones.
President Bush's supposedly dramatic announcement of a planned Middle East Conference (the term soon downgraded to "Meeting"), fell rather flat. So did the regular meetings between Israeli PM Olmert and Palestinian President Abbas ("Abu Mazen"), the Middle East visits by Secretary of State Rice, and the efforts of Tony Blair — appointed Middle East envoy at the not quite glorious end of his term at the helm of the UK.
Israeli doves were rather skeptical about the idea that Olmert — once a Mayor of Jerusalem noted for his harsh treatment of Palestinian inhabitants — had a serious intention of giving up the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. By the same token, the usually highly suspicious and bellicose settlers were rather sluggish and lukewarm, in no hurry to take up arms at the rumors that Olmert has accepted the 1967 borders as "basis for negotiations."
The general Israeli public seemed far more excited by the news that an Israeli was appointed as manager of the British Chelsea Football Team than by the possible outcome of the conference, scheduled to take place on the premises of the American Naval Academy at Annapolis.
The reasons for skepticism were many and obvious. In paraphrase of the term "Peace of the Brave" — created by Charles de Gaulle and beloved of Yasser Arafat — a journalist dubbed the new diplomatic process "The Peace of the Bankrupt": Olmert with his year-long single-digit popularity ratings, and Abu Mazen who had recently been chased out of the Gaza Strip, brought together under the inspiring guidance of George W. Bush, of Iraq War fame.
In fact, the negotiating process was originally envisioned rather differently, in last year's talks between Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and her American counterpart Condoleezza Rice.
As leaked to the press at the time, the Palestinian Authority's security forces, armed and trained by the US and the EU, were supposed to eventually make a decisive move and crush the Hamas, whereupon the victorious non-Hamas Palestinian government would be recognized as "The Good Guys" in the American perception — and graciously invited to the negotiating table.
In the event, it was Hamas that turned the tables and did the crushing — at least in Gaza. Nevertheless, the breaking of the Palestinian National Unity and the proclamation of a non-Hamas government — even though restricted to the West Bank, and having a very partial and doubtful authority also there — was reason enough for the plan to be put into motion.
Having spurned Abu Mazen and refused to deal with him after the death of Arafat — when he won the Palestinian presidential elections by a landslide and had the backing of a solid majority in the Palestinian Legislature — the government of Israel thus embraced him, precisely at the nadir of his career, proclaiming him "a true partner" when his credentials as representative of the Palestinians have become doubtful, to say the least.
Opponents of the Olmert Government were quick to point out the obvious fallacy of negotiating with a Palestinian government representing, at best, a half of its people while conducting relentless war with the other half.
The same argument was, in fact repeated on both sides of the political spectrum, though with opposite conclusions. The right wing cited this as a good reason to stop the negotiations altogether, the left reiterated that Hamas should be invited to the table. The latter position was on some occasions cautiously echoed by mainstream figures such as Minister Without Portfolio Ami Ayalon, failed contender for the Labour Party leadership.
Olmert, however, brushed all criticism aside — secure in the complete backing of Washington, where Hamas is high on the list of "Bad Guys" while Abu Mazen, and his PM Salam Fayad, are held in the highest respect. Of course, there is also criticism in the Palestinian society — and not only among Hamas supporters — for Abu Mazen's conducting negotiations without a real popular mandate.
For their part, the Palestinian President and his aides talked of their intention to eventually submit any agreement signed with Israel to a referendum among the Palestinian People.
For such a strategy to have a shred of a chance, an agreement would need to answer the basic Palestinian aspirations, clearly and obviously enough for a clear majority of Palestinians to vote for it.
In effect, Abu Mazen's margin for making substantial concessions is smaller than Arafat's was at the time of Camp David — which casts even more doubt on Olmert's willingness and ability to come up with the needed bold steps on the Israeli side.
Early every morning, the Israeli radio news broadcasts the statistics provided by the army, on the number of "suspected terrorists" captured in raids on the Palestinian cities in the past night — rarely below five or above twenty. The message is usually terse, giving the names of the towns and villages raided but providing neither the names of the detainees nor any details of the acts with which they were charged. Sometimes there is mention of the organizations to which they belonged — which reveals, among other things, that Olmert, while holding negotiations with Abu Mazen, does not stop the army from regularly arresting members of Fatah, the organization headed by the Palestinian President.
Only rarely do such reports extend beyond a few seconds — usually, in cases where the beleaguered Palestinians stood at bay and managed to wound or kill one the soldiers hunting them. (In one case, when an IDF dog was killed by a Palestinian on whom he was set, there was an extensive report including the dog's name and biography, the soldiers' grief at his death and the announcement that he would be given "a funeral with full military honours").
Except for the cases that the suspects were "killed while resisting arrest" or "while trying to escape", such communiqués invariably end with "the suspects were transferred to Shabak interrogation." For information of what happens during such interrogations, one would need to look up the reports of human rights organizations — which are available to anyone who wants to read them, but are rarely quoted on the radio news.
Given that it takes no more than two weeks to add a hundred new detainees to the 11,000 Palestinians already held in Israeli detention, Palestinians were not highly impressed with Olmert's "good-will gesture" of releasing a total of 90 prisoners on the occasion of the Ramadan Holiday — though that release occasioned a prolonged debate between "hawkish" and "dovish" cabinet ministers, a public expression of displeasure by the army chief of staff, and highly publicized "hesitation" by President Shimon Peres before he finally signed the necessary pardons)..
In Olmert's talks with Abu Mazen, there frequently came up the issue of ending these nightly raids and restoring the de-facto extraterritorial status that the main Palestinian cities ("Area A") enjoyed between the signing of the Oslo II Agreement in 1995 and their reconquest in April 2002 ("Operation Defensive Shield"). The Army, however, would not hear of "giving up the ability to apprehend the terrorists wherever they might be", warning of dire consequences to follow any such decision, and proclaiming the Palestinian Authority's security forces to be "unreliable."
To emphasize the point, though the PA security engaged in arresting Hamas militants, the IDF continued its own raids against the same militants. Also, after the PA ordered a crackdown on the network of charity organizations that are a major political basis for Hamas (and a major source of sustenance for impoverished Palestinians), the IDF conducted a series of raids on the offices of the same charities.
When the proposal to send hundreds of Palestinian security personnel into Nablus came up, Defence Minister Barak made the stipulation that they be active only from six in the morning to midnight, and that in the remaining night hours they keep inside their barracks and not interfere with the doings of Israeli troops.
Acceptance of such terms did not help Abu Mazen's image as the champion of Palestinian independence. To save himself and his supporters from an indelible stain of collaboration, he would need to achieve a quick change and secure an end to the raids and recognition of complete Palestinian control — a tall order, considering the positions of Israel's Defence Minister...
Ehud Barak is clearly determined to break with his party's tradition of taking relatively moderate positions at cabinet meetings in which it takes part. To the contrary, Barak is consistently promoting a tough stance towards the Palestinians on every concrete daily issue. And towards Olmert's efforts and negotiations, the Defence Minister manifests nothing but skepticism and hostility, with such comments as "hot air", "soufflé" and "a house of cards."
Barak's refrain was that "since the PA forces are not to be trusted", territory handed over to them would end up in the hands of Hamas, and missiles be shot right at the Israeli population centers.
Therefore, any such withdrawal must wait upon the completion of an anti-missile system being currently developed by the army, which should be ready "in three to five years" (barring "unexpected difficulties and bugs" which are almost inevitable in such projects). Until then, the army would have to stay where it is...
Predictably, Barak and the generals took a tough stance also on another constantly mooted issue: the checkpoints and roadblocks scattered all over the West Bank roads and highways.
At checkpoints, security checks by Israeli soldiers often proceed sluggishly, making Palestinian motorists wait for long hours before being let through; at roadblocks, the road is simply blocked by piles of earth and rock, making many roads inaccessible to Palestinians and forcing them to go through many extra kilometers of back roads, often narrow and in bad repair.
It had long been said, by Palestinians as well as Israeli and international observers — but now it was also pointed out by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice: there is no chance of recovery and development for the Palestinian economy, as long as such massive obstacles for the flow of goods and persons remain.
After several meetings when the subject was raised, Barak announced the removal of 24 roadblocks (out of several hundreds). The UN teams on the grounds discovered, however, that just prior to this announcement the army had erected some forty new roadblocks in places where there were none before...
However difficult the situation on the West Bank, it is still in a relatively favorable position compared with the Gaza Strip — exactly the region where, if the Government of Israel were to be taken seriously, Israeli occupation has already ended.
More than a year ago, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan voiced his concern about Israeli policies "inflicting further hardships on Palestinians, exacerbating the already high levels of poverty and unemployment and exposing them to more and more serious shortages of water, electricity and food."
Still, at the time when Annan made the above statement (message to Civil Society Conference at Geneva, September 2006), the border crossings into the Gaza Strip were open for much of the time, a lot more goods were coming in than at present, and Gazans could still cross into Egypt and from there travel throughout the world (though forbidden to go to the West Bank).
A year later, an updated grim description was given by Karen Koning AbuZayd of UNRWA (United Nations Works and Relief Agency), which is directly in charge of supporting the Palestinian refugees in Gaza (and increasingly finds itself concerned with non-refugees, too):
"The main commercial crossings into Gaza from Israel and Egypt have been closed since June, so there are no imports or exports. Goods only go in through two military crossings, just barely enough of humanitarian basic emergency supplies. There has been a 71 percent decrease in goods going into Gaza since May 2007. There are now 91 medicines that are out of stock, as compared to 61 last month.
Farmers do not have the money to get their crops picked or to send them to market, so they are rotting [in the fields]. That means that there are no fruits and vegetables to supplement the basic rations that 80 percent of Gaza's population receive either from UNRWA or from the U.N. World Food Program — flour, oil, sugar, a bit of lentils and powdered milk. It's not good enough — UNRWA is only providing 61 percent of the daily nutritional needs [of the Gazan populace]." (Haaretz, Nov. 7, 2007).
The Israeli authorities do have the habit of slightly relaxing the siege from time to time and allowing a trickle of additional goods into the Strip, just enough "to avert a humanitarian crisis." However, "a humanitarian crisis" in this context is interpreted very narrowly, as synonymous with "open mass starvation."
Anything short of that — the great majority of Gazans sunk in abject poverty, an "economic meltdown", increasingly polluted water sources, a near-collapsing sewage system, mass undernourishment which (usually) does not kill but whose effects will be felt by the young generation of Gazans for as long as they live — does not count as "a humanitarian crisis"...
It would be wrong to say that Israelis have no idea at all about what their elected government is perpetrating in Gaza. Several tens of thousands read Haaretz, which carries some reports of the situation at an average of once a week (though not always very prominently).
And though far more rarely, sometimes the topic even breaks into the electronic media — for example, the Channel 10 TV News, which featured items on critically ill Gazan patients desperately waiting for permission to get treatment in Israel, and on the new wing of Gaza's Shifa Hospital whose construction was stopped since building materials are no longer allowed in. Still, most Israelis have only a vague idea of what is happening — and moreover, have no great interest in learning more, and often react with hostility when activists try to rub their nose in the facts (for example, by distributing leaflets and brochures at busy Tel-Aviv intersections).
"But these people in Gaza brought it upon themselves! We withdrew from there, destroyed all the settlements, and they voted for Hamas. They are shooting Qassams on Sderot, so they deserve what is coming to them!"
It has proven very difficult to make people outside the "peace and human rights" circle understand just how limited and deceptive had been Sharon's "Disengagement from Gaza", how the state of Israel kept control of all entrances and exits.
Even in the Rafah Crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, which was supposed to be under European monitoring with no Israel troops present, Israel turned out to have an effective veto power regarding its opening. Because of an ill-considered decision to lodge in Israel, the European monitors have daily to get in and out of the Gaza Strip — through crossings which Israel can open or close at its discretion.
And meanwhile, in the minds of Israelis the name of Sderot became an emotive name and blanket legitimization for each and any act committed against the civilian population of Gaza.
Everybody who listens to Israeli news broadcasts would unavoidably know of the anguish of the inhabitants of Sderot, and not the least the town's children — never knowing a moment of true rest, ever ready to rush to shelter when the dreaded alarm sounds.
This anxiety in Sderot is all too real, even if there are very few actual casualties. The people of this development town seem to have become hostages of a government policy of confrontation and escalation that is actually strengthened by their constantly reported ordeal.
Of course, the same media that cover Sderot in heart-rending full-page articles make hardly any mention of Palestinian children, who live in at least as much fear and who stand a far greater risk of being blown to bits.
To cite just one example, the 16-year old boy crushed in early September under the threads of an Israeli bulldozer, engaged in uprooting orchards which "may give cover to Qassam-shooting squads", got a bare laconic remark from the army — "unfortunate collateral damage."
Complicating factors are hardly ever mentioned, such as the direct casual relations between the killing of Palestinians (some 700 in the past year, according to the recent proud boasting of PM Olmert) and the retaliatory shooting of missiles (which cause destruction and panic but only rarely kill).
On the eve of the Jewish New Year (Sept. 13) there was a surprise from Ismail Haniyeh — Gaza-based Hamas leader and Prime Minister of one of the two rival Palestinian governments. Through international mediators, Haniyeh proposed to discuss with the Olmert Government the instituting of an immediate and bilateral ceasefire, and offered to impose such a ceasefire on the smaller groups such as the Islamic Jihad (which do most of the shooting).
The group of mainstream dovish writers and artists headed by such well-known figures as Amos Oz, A.B. Yehoshua, David Grossman and Yehoshua Sobol was aroused to action, prominently publishing a call for the government to engage in such ceasefire negotiations.
However, Haniyeh's offer (and the writers' petition) were not so much rejected as brushed aside. Indeed, there was an immediate, noticeable notching up of both the military offensive on the ground in the Strip itself and the economic offensive carried out through a variety of creative new measures. (All simultaneously with continuing the talks with Abu Mazen and his team.)
Skirmishing in the political arena
Haim Ramon, highly versatile politician and confidential Olmert advisor, recently ended serving a term of half a year's public service, imposed on him for having kissed a girl soldier against her will (this happened when he was on his way to the cabinet meeting which resolved last year upon going to war in Lebanon).
Resuming his political career as a minister without portfolio, despite the protests of feminist groups, Ramon immediately embarked on two simultaneous tracks.
Ramon entered deeply into the negotiations with Abu Mazen, establishing a prominent dovish profile — particularly, calling for relinquishing Israeli rule in the "outlying Arab neighborhoods" of Jerusalem, and for establishing an unspecified "special regime" for the "Holy Area" (i.e., the Old City and its environs).
At the same time, however, Ramon also made himself a conspicuous proponent of ever-tougher measures of collective punishment in Gaza. Especially, he took up the idea of cutting off Gaza's electricity and water supplies, hitherto advocated only by the extreme right.
Ramon's advocacy of the idea — immediately getting banner headlines in the mass circulation papers — transformed it from a staple item in rabble-rousing demagogic speeches into a concrete idea, placed for implementation on the government agenda.
Gaza is, indeed, largely dependent on Israel for its electricity and water — a dependence created during four decades of Israeli dominance. The majority of Israeli public opinion, already long primed to accept uncritically any measure taken against the Gazans, was ready to accept this measure, too — even though the army's own experts gave their opinion that it would exacerbate, rather than stop, the shooting of missiles.
However, publication of this "brilliant idea" brought on a sharp protest from UN Secretary General Ban (the most outspoken statement by him on a Middle Eastern issue since he took up his position), and a more muted one from the US-led diplomatic "Quartet."
Moreover, since there are quite substantial grounds to consider such a measure as a violation of International Law, the government felt the need to take juridical preparatory measures.
Accordingly, the government duly and formally proclaimed the Gaza Strip to be "A Hostile Zone." This implied, or so they argued, that Gaza would no longer be an Occupied Territory in which the Fourth Geneva Convention sets strict rules of what the Occupying Power is allowed and not allowed to do.
An immediate result was that Bank Hapoalim, Israel's largest, resolved to cut off all business relations with the Palestinian banks in Gaza.
Since even at the heyday of Oslo the Palestinians were never allowed to mint their own money, and were constrained to remain dependent on the Israeli Shekel as their daily medium of exchange, cutting off the flow of Shekels into the Gaza Strip would have had devastating results for its already prostrate economy.
Ironically, as it turned out, this measure would have mainly harmed Abu Mazen, who has been continuing payment of salaries to a large part of the Palestinian government employees in Gaza, so as to keep them from going over to Hamas.
Without Shekels in the banks, such payments would have had to stop — while Hamas continued to pay its own people with the help of suitcases full of cash, smuggled from Egypt through the tunnels under the border. Rather sheepishly, the government requested Bank Hapoalim to continue dealing with the Gaza banks "for the time being."
Meanwhile, however, the electricity cutoff scheme was duly approved by the cabinet — after the right-wing opposition both accused the government of doing nothing to help the people of Sderot and started to take a bit more seriously the forthcoming Annapolis Conference and the possible concessions to which Olmert might commit himself.
Barak held a meeting with his generals, setting out the date and technical details for the cutoff. Thereupon, Israel's human rights organizations joined forces in lodging an urgent appeal to the Supreme Court, and prepared for a hard-fought legal battle.
However, Attorney-General Mazuz — whose job it would have been to represent the government position — declared he would not do so, until the government proved to him that the measure "would not hurt basic humanitarian needs." At least for the time being, the measure had to be shelved, to Barak's loud anger and chagrin.
While public attention was riveted to the electricity issue, the army moved to considerably tighten the siege in numerous other ways, which apparently Mazuz did consider to be legal: cutting the supply of fuel to the Strip, as well as denying altogether the entry of what the government declared to be "non-essential luxuries" — among them milk powder for babies, children's toys, cleaning materials, salt and other basic foodstuffs.
Meanwhile, Barak repeatedly launched ominous announcements of a forthcoming "major military operation in Gaza", which well-informed commentators interpreted as no less than a total reconquest of its entire territory.
Articles in the Arab press asserted that the U.S. had already given its approval to such an operation, to take place "after Annapolis" — and the immediate hot denial by Washington did not convince everybody. However, as the same commentators noted, such an invasion would be "far from a walk in the park."
When one of the daily incursions resulted in the killing not only of Palestinians but also of an Israeli soldier, a reserve paratrooper officer was quoted by Ha'aretz: "These people aren't terrorists, they fight as soldiers. In a direct confrontation, the IDF has superiority over them, but in all parameters — training, equipment quality, operational discipline — we are facing an army, not gangs." (Haaretz, Nov. 8). Sergeant-Major (Res.) Ehud Efrati, comrade-in-arms of this (unnamed) officer, was killed in battle with Hamas troops a few days before.
Moreover, the current American predicament in Iraq has clearly demonstrated the folly of launching an invasion and conquest without an exit strategy — and such is far from formulated in this case.
Keeping the troops in a re-occupied Gaza would likely expose them to intensive guerrilla activity, a contingency for which Hamas and other groups are known to be already preparing and training — while a withdrawal from Gaza might entail a resurgence of Hamas and renewal of the shooting of missiles at Israeli cities.
Meanwhile, Israeli generals are known to feel reluctance at committing too much of their available forces to Gaza, while Israel's northern borders with Lebanon and Syria constitute what many consider "a business left unfinished with the way last year's war ended."
The news bursting out on the evening of September 6 was puzzling, to say the least. Syrian TV announced that the country's Air Force has beaten off an attempted incursion by Israeli warplanes, and that these planes had not caused any damage or casualties in Syrian territory.
Meanwhile, the Israeli media were reduced to translating and quoting the announcements of their Syrian counterparts. As commentators and news presenters admitted to their audience, they had been specifically forbidden by the military censorship to divulge any information in their possession from other than Syrian sources — the most blatant use of censorship in decades.
The censor did, however, authorize the screening of footage showing senior generals in an obvious festive mood, celebrating some success of whose nature nothing was disclosed.
The mystery did not last very long. Soon, there were ever more extensive and detailed accounts published in the international press, obviously based on deliberate leaks from Israeli and American official sources.
The Israeli media was graciously allowed to quote these foreign reports, but the government continued (and continues, up to the time of writing) to react to them with "no comment".
Meanwhile, the foreign reports, backed now with satellite photos, asserted in great detail that in north-east Syria a nuclear reactor had been constructed, or was in the process of construction, with North Korean help, and that this installation was completely destroyed in an Israeli air raid (which incidentally involved a violation of Turkish air space, causing a diplomatic incident with Ankara).
Such a raid is well consistent with the long standing Israeli policy known informally as "The Begin Doctrine" — a doctrine never officially stated, but which can be clearly inferred from PM Menachem Begin's destruction of the Iraqi nuclear pile in 1981.
In effect, already for several decades Israel had arrogated to itself the right of maintaining an arsenal of at least a hundred nuclear weapons and installing them on missiles with a range long enough to reach beyond Teheran, as well as on submarines which could strike from the depths of the sea ("second-strike capacity").
At the same time, Israel is completely intolerant of any attempt by any of its Middle Eastern neighbors to reciprocate and acquire a similar capacity, and considers itself empowered to use force so as to nip any such attempt in the bud. By making a major issue of the Iranian nuclear program while never referring to the Israeli one, the United States, as well as the EU, implicitly endorses this Israeli policy.
Despite Olmert's not taking any official credit for the Syrian raid, when its details became known to the general public there was some improvement in the PM's extremely low popularity ratings. It might have been higher had he trumpeted his triumph with the full panoply of nationalist rhetoric, as Begin did in 1981 (and registered a major victory in that year's general elections).
Olmert's exercise in censorship and self-effacement was mostly interpreted as a genuine effort to avoid the outbreak of an all-out war with Syria, by minimizing the loss of face to Syrian President Bashar Assad and trying to avoid a situation where Assad would have felt constrained to launch a retaliatory attack on Israel.
Pointing in the same direction was the invitation rather reluctantly made by the US — reportedly, at Olmert's explicit request — for Syria to take part in the Annapolis Conference. Bush is, however, not really interested in the participation of the Syrians, who are among his 'bad guys', considered responsible for facilitating the anti-American guerrillas in Iraq.
Washington made clear that the Syrian Golan Heights, held by Israel since 1967, would not be on the Annapolis agenda, and that the Syrians were being invited simply in order to act as observers while Palestinian issues were discussed. This seems to have ensured that Damascus would turn down the invitation.
Though Olmert got away with his Syrian raid without inciting a general war, the affair remains a source of unease when considered — as many do — as a "dress rehearsal" for an eventual attack on the Iranian nuclear installations, such as has been openly discussed in the Western media for at least two years by now.
According to a recently published scenario — attributed to US Vice President Cheney, leader of the neo-conservatives struggling with the Iraq fiasco — Israel would launch a surprise attack on Iran, which would precipitate retaliation by long-range (conventional) Iranian missiles — whereupon the US would intervene "to protect Israel". Syria, Lebanon and/or Palestinian Gaza might get drawn in, in one way or another.
The real possibility of such a desperate last gamble by those who already sustained heavy losses in the Iraqi venture was evident in President Bush's use of the term "A Third World War" in connection to a possible conflict with Iran. And the election of Sarkozy to the presidency of France opened the possibility that — rather then opposing and trying to hinder American warlike adventures, as it did in 2003 — Paris might this time be a partner to such disastrous schemes.
Thus, we must distract some of the energy needed for dealing with the current grave situation in the Palestinian territories, and prepare for the contingency of a major war breaking out. Yet ironically, the very possibility of a war with Iran increases Bush's need to show some positive concrete result out of Annapolis, so as to increase the support in the Arab and Muslim World, which he would vitally need in such a war.
The memory of the 2000 Camp David fiasco and its very bloody aftermath clearly haunts anyone who seeks a new Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement, and it is doubtful that Camp David will ever again be used as the venue for such enterprise. Annapolis, with a long past as a Naval Academy but none as the site of summits, was clearly chosen in an effort to mark "a new start."
Furthermore, to avert a repetition of Camp David, Olmert and Abu Mazen were set to the task of negotiating in advance, and drafting a joint declaration. This is to be brought ready-made to Annapolis, and ceremoniously presented to an imposing array of diplomatic delegations and leaders from all over the world — but without the Hamas, which cannot be forgiven for having won the elections that the US urged upon the Palestinians.
The prior achievement of such a document has also been deemed crucial for getting the participation of Saudi Arabia — so much desired by Olmert.
For the Saudis, however, being seen in public with the Prime Minister of Israel would amount to a de-facto recognition of Israel. And this richest of Arab states, whose king also acts as Guardian of the Holy Cities, Mecca and Medina, would not buy a pig in a poke. It is they who initiated and sponsored the Arab Peace Initiative, whereby Saudi Arabia (and all Arab states) would recognize Israel — but only in exchange for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967.
Though not precisely rejecting this initiative, Olmert is far from clearly accepting it. While, the Americans sought to sweeten the Saudis by the offer of a major new arms deal, a Saudi presence at Annapolis would clearly depend on at least an Israeli "down payment" towards ending the occupation. And the smaller Gulf States would likely follow the Saudi lead.
And so, Olmert and Abu Mazen embarked on an intensive series of meetings and talks — almost invariably held at the Israeli Prime Ministerial mansion in West Jerusalem. (A proposal to hold the talks on Israeli and Palestinian premises alternately was quashed after the Israeli Security Service announced the unearthing of an alleged plot by members of its Palestinian counterpart to assassinate Olmert on the way to Jericho.)
In their earlier meetings, the two met rather informally, with no aides present and no minutes taken, for what was described as "brainstorming". Some leaks published in Haaretz had it that Olmert agreed in principle to a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, to borders based on the 1967 lines and to giving pre-1967 territory in exchange for the parts of the West Bank Israel would annex, on a one-to-one basis (Barak's famous "generous offers" in 2000 were to give one square kilometer of the waterless Negev desert in "exchange" for every nine square kilometers of fertile West Bank land which would go to Israel).
Olmert was, moreover, reportedly willing to consider the creation of a Palestinian-controlled corridor between the West Bank and Gaza — though to be implemented "only after the overthrow of Hamas rule there". And in general, Olmert, even at his most generous and eloquent, was rather vague about any binding timetable for implementation of whatever would be agreed.
Even so, Palestinian negotiators at the time asserted that "should Israel bind itself in a formal signed agreement to all that Olmert said to Abu Mazen, it would be an enormous step forward". But, with many bitter experiences from previous rounds of talks, the Palestinians did not really expect this to happen — and they were soon proven right.
Conspiracy in the kitchen cabinet
As already noted, throughout the past months Ehud Barak has distinguished himself with a consistently hawkish and obstructive stance, in marked contrast to the traditional role assigned to Labour Party leaders in Israeli coalition cabinets. Various explanations were offered: that it derived from Barak's genuine opinion and assessment of the situation — i.e., that Abu Mazen is powerless and the PA security forces weak and unreliable; that it is a "sour grapes" attitude — i.e., Barak cannot stand the idea of Olmert succeeding where he himself failed at Camp David; that Barak's main concern is with a future electoral contest against the Likud's Binyamin Netanyahu, in which the Labor Party leader might feel that a hawkish image would be helpful. (But as such strategies often do, it increasingly alienated Barak from what should have been his core constituency, as evident for example in the cold reaction he got at the Rabin Memorial Rally).
Just a few months ago, Foreign Minster Tzipi Livni was busy cultivating a dovish image; in fact, she had outspokenly advocated the holding of such a conference as Annapolis, at a time when Olmert was far from enthusiastic about the idea.
Yet, as soon as it became a concrete issue Livni started expressing increasing reservations and doubts. Her obstructions, in fact, increasingly chimed in with those of Barak, and commentators started to refer to the two of them as "a new political alliance". This was at least in part motivated by pique at Ramon's conspicuous position in negotiations with the Palestinians, and Olmert was able to break apart the Livni-Barak Axis by the simple expedient of shunting Ramon aside and appointing Livni to head the Israeli negotiating team. After all, isn't she the Foreign Minister?
Even so, Livni continued talking of "the need to reduce expectations" and not to get "too soon" to the "core issues" (border, Jerusalem and refugees; her position on the last is particularly intransigent). Instead, the Foreign Minister proposed "making some visible gestures on the ground, in order to reassure the Palestinians. However, the implementation of most such gestures is in the hands of the army — i.e., of Livni's erstwhile partner Barak, who proved singularly uncooperative.
Meanwhile, the motivations and intentions of the Prime Minister himself are far from clear.
Olmert has already proven himself a consummate politician, in the very fact of his surviving when nearly everybody predicted his imminent fall in the aftermath of last year's Lebanon fiasco and the polls continually giving him single-digit popularity ratings (and often small digits, at that). In the past year he had been simultaneously and successfully juggling such balls as the Winograd Commission of Inquiry, still due to present its final report on the conduct of that war; no less than three police investigations on various charges of corruption; and last but not least, the discovery of prostate cancer (a light form, perfectly capable of treatment and not necessitating any change in his busy schedule, the PM's doctors hastened to announce).
However, in spite of this proven acumen in the rough daily routine of the political arena, Olmert has yet to prove himself capable of any feat of statesmanship, worthy of being remembered one day after the end of his term.
To many observers, his conduct of the negotiations seemed no more than an extension of the same juggling game: doing just enough to gain the sympathy of the Israeli Left and the international diplomatic community, while avoiding any real concessions which would require a break and confrontation with the Right.
In one ominous statement, he estimated at "twenty years" the possible time span until an agreement with the Palestinians is actually implemented, though he later reversed himself and expressed his "hope" that it might be achieved before the end of the term of George W. Bush (i.e. January 2009).
President Bush himself presented another enigma. Since making the original announcement of the conference in July, he hardly took any further interest (at least in public), letting Secretary of State Rice run with the ball.
She seemed to warm up to the job, some of her pronouncements on the Palestinians' difficult situation reminding commentators of her past as a black woman in the US South during the Civil Rights Movement. Certainly, Rice has every reason to want the success of Annapolis for her record. However, the recent bitter experience of Colin Powell conclusively demonstrates that a US Secretary of State stands no chance of achieving anything in the Middle East without having the full backing and full clout of the president.
To this is added a more fundamental issue — namely, to exactly how much does the full clout of George W. Bush amount, in the fourth year of the interminable Iraq disaster?
Whatever the particular tangled reasons involved, personal and political, internal and international, there can no doubt that from the moment that the Olmert-Abu Mazen "brainstorming" turned into formal negotiations aimed at achieving a binding document, the pace grew ever slower. Seemingly resolved points continually raised their ugly heads as major obstacles and bones of contention.
And meanwhile, the settlers started to take their own hand in events, as they have done in all significant Israeli political developments of the past three decades.
Though sluggish to begin with, the settlers and their allies gradually started to feel alarmed at Olmert's moves. Having at its disposal ample funds from wealthy backers abroad (and from government budgets funneled to it in its officially-recognized role as "a regional municipal organization"), the settler "Judea and Samaria Council" embarked on a large-scale advertisement campaign.
The slogan "The Olmert-Abu Bluff Agreement will blow up in our faces" was prominently displayed on enormous signs, placed for a considerable payment at the sides of passenger buses all over the country.
The "Jerusalem Taboo" had lost much of its power since the 1990s, when all mainstream politicians felt constrained to swear public allegiance to "United Jerusalem, Eternal Capital of Israel"; in 1996 then incumbent Shimon Peres was so intimidated by the slogan "Peres will divide Jerusalem" that he was driven to conduct a defensive and apologetic elections campaign, ending in a predictable failure.
Nowadays, the Jerusalem issue has been thrown wide open to public debate. Nevertheless, "Partition of Jerusalem" has not completely lost its power as a nationalist bugaboo and rallying call. Nir Barkat, Jerusalem Municipal Councilor of Olmert's own Kadima Party, sought to carve out a niche in national politics by starting a "Petition Against the Partition of Jerusalem", gaining for it the signatures of numerous Knesset Members, including some government supporters (even one from the Labour Party).
Olmert aides criticized Ramon for having "spoken out rashly and prematurely" on the Jerusalem issue. Nevertheless, once the battle was joined, Olmert himself spoke out on the Knesset floor, stating that many Arab villages "were artificially annexed to Jerusalem in 1967, did not constitute a real part of the city, and were rarely if ever visited by Jewish Israelis" — and therefore, could be given up with no harm caused to any Israeli interest. (An argument which Olmert himself had vehemently rejected as mayor of the "united" Jerusalem.)
The settlers' main strategy is to target the more right-wing elements among the Olmert Government's following and pressure them into either quitting the government and bringing it down, or exacting an effective veto over any significant concessions, as the price of their staying in. Two parties represented in the Olmert coalition and forming a considerable part of its parliamentary support are regarded in such a light: Shas — representing a sizeable part of the Mizrahi community (Jews originating in Arab and Muslim countries, and their Israeli-born descendants) and Avigdor Lieberman's "Israel is Our Home" party, drawing its main support from the more recently arrived Russians.
Shas has a long history of being the most right-wing element in relatively dovish governments. They had been in Rabin's cabinet at the time of the Oslo Agreement, to which their presence in the government rendered invaluable legitimacy (in return, it was widely rumored, for generous budgets to their religious institutions).
Later, Shas bolted the Barak government just before Camp David — to which was attributed Barak's intransigence on the Temple Mount issue, one of Camp David's major stumbling blocks.
Their present tough stance on Jerusalem ("Danger! Sacrilege in the Holy City!") was interpreted by cynical commentators as a means to get additional budgets and key positions in the state-controlled rabbinical establishment (Haaretz, Nov. 9).
Lieberman is considered in many ways a maverick in the Israeli political scene. For some years he had been allied with the mainstream settler movement — and witnessed "from the inside" the settlers' utter failure to mobilize mainstream Israelis against Sharon's evacuation of the Gaza settlements, in spite of desperate efforts.
This evidently convinced Lieberman that the traditional extreme right agenda — "Greater Israel", "not an inch", planting Jewish settlement in all Biblically-hallowed lands — was a futile dead end, evoking no response outside the limited Nationalist-Religious community.
Conversely, Lieberman discovered in the general public a considerable reservoir of raw anti-Arab feeling, directed not only against the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories but also — and especially — against the Arabs who constitute twenty percent of Israel's citizens, who are represented in the Knesset (since last year, also in the government) and who are increasingly assertive and militant in defence of their rights.
This anti-Arab feeling Lieberman tapped with considerable success, by proposing to so define the future borders that many of the Arab Israelis would be behind them, thus "ensuring the long-term Jewish majority in Israel".
Further, he adopted the habit of regularly making inflammatory statements on the Knesset floor, inevitably provoking a shouting match with Arab KM's — invariably given prominence on the evening TV news.
In addition, Lieberman has been cultivating the Russian communal feeling, consciously striving to model himself on Vladimir Putin — admired by many Russian Israelis as by a lot of their former country people. Even among Russians who do not share Lieberman's outright racism, quite a few seem to consider him "a strong man" who might take good care of their communal interests.
None of the above in principle precludes Lieberman from going along with an agreement involving Israeli withdrawal from a large portion of the West Bank and/or from the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. On the latter point, indeed, he specifically declared himself in favor ("Yes, by all means get rid of the Jerusalem Arabs and stop paying their social welfare from Israel's treasury!"), though he insisted that "The Holy Places must remain Israeli". This "dovish" statement Lieberman "counterbalanced" by launching a televised broadside at the "leftist traitors" of Gush Shalom and Yesh Gvul.
With all of that, Lieberman did start feeling the heat of the settler campaign, particularly when they directed an appeal to his own core constituency by huge inflammatory ads in Israel's Russian-language papers. (Israel is the only country in the world, except for Russia, where several Russian-language daily papers appear and have a mass circulation, in addition to scores of weekly magazines.)
Lieberman's increasingly outspoken hostility to the Annapolis Summit might be either genuine or a pose aimed at getting political points; either way, Olmert can't afford to ignore it.
Early November, the settler council head Danny Dayan expressed some satisfaction with the course of the campaign: "I am now more optimistic than I was a few months ago. The ability of Olmert to implement what he wants to do is more limited. Of course I would have been much more satisfied had these two parties left the government or given Olmert an unequivocal ultimatum.
Even so, a few months ago they were talking of signing in Annapolis a detailed agreement, to be implemented later but to be already binding on Israel, very like the Geneva Agreement but this time with a governmental approval. Now, they are talking about a much more vague declaration which would leave the details for later negotiations. I don't want to take full credit, and I don't to say that the danger of losing Judea and Samaria is over — it by no means is. Still, we in the settler community can point to some concrete achievements". (BeSheva settler weekly, Nov. 1).
And so, we go to print with the Annapolis Conference (or Annapolis Summit, or Annapolis Meeting, or whatever) due just ahead, on November 26 — unless it is put off again.
So short of the deadline, much of what should have already been in place, nailed down in the document which is due to be presented to the world, is still in considerable doubt. The common Israeli-Palestinian declaration, which by now should have been getting its finishing touches, is instead the subject of dispute — with "a deep gulf" reported to be dividing the Israeli and Palestinian delegations.
How detailed or vague would be the references to the "core issues"? For example, would the Palestinians get their demand that the territory of their future state be fixed at 6,205 square kilometers, which is precisely what the West Bank and Gaza Strip amount to — so that Israel would truly have to compensate the Palestinians for every square kilometer annexed?
Would any timetable be fixed for implementation — and if so, what loopholes would it contain, giving legitimacy for non-compliance? And with the famous "Roadmap" taken out of mothballs, who would monitor the compliance and announce that the Israelis had indeed "dismantled the illegal settlement outposts" and that the Palestinians had reciprocated by getting rid of the "terrorist infrastructure"?
Meanwhile, Olmert agreed to free some 400 Palestinian prisoners ahead of the conference. But would the old and ill prisoners held since before Oslo be released, though they are considered to have "blood on their hands"? Would Marwan Bargouthi — the only Fatah leader considered popular enough to be truly accepted as a national leader — be released, though he is considered to have "blood on his hands"?
With so many crucial issues left completely in the dark (by the time you read this, some of them may have become at least a bit clearer) it is difficult to formulate any coherent opinion.
Israeli peace seekers remain confused and deeply divided. Some regard Annapolis as a chance — the last chance — to achieve peace with the Palestinians; others see it as an exercise in futility, little more than a quickly-forgotten "photo opportunity"; while still others regard it as a threat, a place where impossible terms would be presented to the Palestinians and their refusal be again interpreted as "rejection of a generous offer".
In the final calculation, however, the success or failure of Annapolis seems to hang on one thin thread. Namely, does George W. Bush truly care for the political survival of the Good Guy Abu Mazen and for the survival of Salam Fayad, whom the President on various occasions declared to be an Excellent Good Guy?
Assuming that the answer is "yes" — and assuming that the President of the United States is able to do something concrete about it — then Abu Mazen and Fayad would come back from Annapolis with a concrete, tangible achievement which they could show to their people, and which could serve as a proof that Palestinians could gain something from diplomatically dealing with Israel (and with the US).
If they come back empty-handed, that will serve as a proof, just as clear, that nothing could be gained by diplomacy — in which case Abu Mazen will not remain in his position much longer (one can hardly say "remain in power", since he has so little). The vacuum would most likely be filled by those whom the US considers baddies — Hamas, or somebody more radical than them.
The divisions among Palestinians since the Gaza events of this year have been disastrous, resulting in numerous deaths — just now, Nov. 12, we get the report of seven Fatah supporters killed during a mass rally in Gaza City proving Fatah's resurgence and drawing Hamas' lethal ire. People already exhausted by oppression, occupation and siege have on top of that to endure bloody internecine struggles. But at least, this division allows the Palestinian people to engage on the international arena in the old game of Good Cop/Bad Cop.
On November 7, the veteran Israeli commentator Akiva Eldar published an urgent call upon American Jews to become "The Jewish Lobby Israel Needs" — i.e., not a lobby which supports all policies of whatever Israeli government happens to hold power, or which even pushes Israeli and US politicians to greater support of oppressive policies, but rather a lobby actively promoting peace with the Palestinians. He stated: "The next few weeks may determine the future of Zionism. This is not an exaggeration. If the upcoming Annapolis peace conference ends the same way as the Camp David summit of 2000, the future of the Jewish state will be in jeopardy" ("Forward," Nov 07, 2007).
On the same day, Yediot Aharonot's economic commentator Sever Plocker referred to the plummeting of the Dollar and the enormously growing currency reserves of Russia, China and the Gulf states, and he concluded: "Three new empires are arising, which might shape the fate of the global economics and geo-politics. And we? Israel has tied itself to one power, the US, and in that one power to the administration of George W. Bush. The three emerging empires are not particularly friendly to Israel, one of them being positively hostile. Our leaders have shaped no strategies for a changing world, are caught unprepared, and do not even appreciate the depth of the problem".
For his part, Ben Dror Yemini of Ma'ariv expressed his concern with the growing questioning of Israel's legitimacy by Western intellectuals, including among Jews — which "would be a much worse threat when today's students and post-graduates become tomorrow's decision makers in Europe and America". He called upon the government to use Annapolis as an indispensable chance to restore Israel's international legitimacy, by "saying an emphatic yes to the end of the occupation, yes to the creation of a Palestinian state, but an emphatic no to the Right of Return — since Israel must remain a Jewish state" (Ma'ariv, Nov. 9).
True, if they wish, Israelis can still close their eyes and ears. The daily life in Tel-Aviv seems not substantially different from that in London or New York. It is the Palestinians — especially those of besieged and harassed Gaza — who are in urgent need of an end to the conflict.
Yet, an increasing number of Israelis, without necessarily sharing our views, start feeling a bit uncomfortable with a dawning awareness that ultimately it is Israel which is in need of gaining peace, recognition and acceptance in the region where we happen to be.
But it goes so damned slow!
The Editors
